Publications

  1. On Understanding the Effects of GAAP Reserve Assumptions, Transactions of the Society of Actuaries, 27, 1975, 71‑88.
  2. Measuring the Interest‑Rate Risk, Transactions of the Society of Actuaries, XXXVII, 1985: 241-57.
  3. Reply to the Comments on “Measuring the Interest Rate Risk”, Transactions of the Society of Actuaries, XXXVII, 1985: 297-302.

 

  1. A Convergence Theorem for Competitive Bidding with Differential Information, Econometrica, 47, 1979, 679‑88. Erratum.
  2. Rational Expectations, Information Acquisition, and Competitive Bidding, Econometrica, 49, 1981, 921‑43.
    • Reprinted in The Economic Theory of Auctions, edited by Paul Klemperer, London: Edward Elgar Publishing, 1999.
  3. The Value of Information in a Sealed Bid Auction (with Robert Weber), Journal of Mathematical Economics, 10, 1982, 105‑14.
    • Reprinted in The Economic Theory of Auctions, edited by Paul Klemperer, London: Edward Elgar Publishing, 1999.
  4. A Theory of Auctions and Competitive Bidding (with Robert Weber), Econometrica, 50, 1982, 1089‑1122.
    • Reprinted in Game Theory in Economics, edited by Ariel Rubinstein, London: Edward Elgar Publishing, 1990.
    • Reprinted in The Economics of Information, edited by Steven A. Lippman and John E. Anderson, London: Edward Elgar Publishing, 1994.
    • Reprinted in The Economic Theory of Auctions, edited by Paul Klemperer, London: Edward Elgar Publishing, 1999.
    • Reprinted in Readings in Applied Microeconomic Theory: Market Forces and Solutions, edited by Robert E. Kuenne, Blackwell Publishers, 2000.
  5. Competitive Bidding with Proprietary Information (with Richard Engelbrecht‑Wiggans and Robert Weber), Journal of Mathematical Economics, 11, 1983, 161‑69.
  6. The Economics of Competitive Bidding: A Selective Survey, Social Goals and Social Organization: A Volume in Honor of Elisha Pazner, edited by L. Hurwicz, D. Schmeidler and H. Sonnenschein, London: Cambridge University Press, 1985, Chapter 9, 261-89.
  7. Auction Theory, Advances in Economic Theory: Fifth World Congress, edited by Truman Bewley, London: Cambridge University Press, 1987, 1-32.
  8. Auctions and Bidding: A Primer, Journal of Economic Perspectives, 3, Summer 1989, 3-22.
    • Reprinted in Readings in Microeconomic Theory, edited by Manfredi La Manna, London: Dryden Press, 1997, 95-113.
  9. Procuring Universal Service: Putting Auction Theory to Work, in Le Prix Nobel: The Nobel Prizes, 1996, Nobel Foundation, 1997, 382-392. (Also available on the Nobel Prize site.)  
  10. Game Theory and the Spectrum Auctions, European Economic Review, 42 (1998), 771-778.
  11. Procuring Universal Telephone Service, in 1997 Industry Economics Conference, Industry Commission (ed.), Conference Proceedings, 10-11 July 1997, AGPS, Canberra.
  12. Combination Bidding in Spectrum Auctions, in Competition, Regulation and Convergence: Current Trends in Telecommunications Research, Sharon Gillett and Ingo Vogelsang (Eds), Mahwah, New Jersey: Lawrence Erlbaum Associates, Publishers, 1999, pp 19-26.
  13. A Theory of Auctions and Competitive Bidding, II (with Robert Weber), in The Economic Theory of Auctions, Paul Klemperer (ed.), Edward Elgar Publishing, 1999.
  14. Putting Auction Theory to Work: The Simultaneous Ascending Auction, Journal of Political Economy, 108:2 (April, 2000), 245-272.
  15. Package Bidding: Vickrey vs Ascending Auctions (with Lawrence M. Ausubel), Revue Economique, vol. 3, no 3, May 2002, 391-402.
  16. Ascending Auctions with Package Bidding (with Lawrence M. Ausubel), Frontiers of Theoretical Economics, 1(1), August 2002: Article 1. (Republished in BePress Advances in Theoretical Economics).
  17. The Lovely but Lonely Vickrey Auction (with Lawrence M. Ausubel), in Combinatorial Auctions (Peter Cramton, Richard Steinberg and Yoav Shoham, eds), MIT Press, 2005.
  18. Ascending Proxy Auctions (with Lawrence M. Ausubel), in Combinatorial Auctions (Peter Cramton, Richard Steinberg and Yoav Shoham, eds), MIT Press, 2005.
  19. The Clock-Proxy Auction: A Practical Combinatorial Design (with Lawrence M. Ausubel and Peter Cramton), in Combinatorial Auctions (Peter Cramton, Richard Steinberg and Yoav Shoham, eds), MIT Press, 2005. 
  20. Matching with Contracts (with John Hatfield), American Economic Review 95(4), 2005, 913-935.
  21. Package Auctions and Package Exchanges (2004 Fisher-Schultz lecture), Econometrica, 75(4), July 2007, 935-966.
  22. Core-Selecting Auctions (with Bob Day), International Journal of Game Theory, 36, 2008, 393-407. 
  23. The Promise of Prediction Markets (22 co-authors), Science, 320, May 2008, 877-878.
  24. Substitute Goods, Auctions and Equilibrium with Bruno StruloviciJournal of Economic Theory, Vol 144, Issue 1, June 2008, pp 212-247.
  25. Simplified Mechanisms with an Application to Sponsored-Search Auctions. Games and Economic Behavior, Sept 2010, vol 70, Issue 1: 62-70. 
  26. Assignment Messages and Exchanges, AEJ-Micro 1:2, August 2009, 95-113.
  27. Online Advertising: Heterogeneity and Conflation in Market Design, with Jon Levin. American Economic Review, Vol 100, Issue 2, May 2010, pp 603-607.
  28. Ascending Prices and Package Bidding: A Theoretical and Experimental Analysis,” with Yuanchuan Lien and John Kagel, American Economic Journal: Microeconomics, Aug 2010, vol 2, number 3: 160-185. [Data files, Instructions, Online Appendix].
  29. Critical Issues in Market Design” Economic Inquiry, vol 48, number 2, April 2011: 311-320. Doi:10.1111/j.1465-7295.2010.00357.x
  30. Designing Random Allocation Mechanisms: Theory and Applications” with Eric Budish, Yeon-Koo Che and Fuhito Kojima. American Economic Review, vol 103, number 2, April 2013: 585-623. [published version]
  31. Optimal Incentives in Core-Selecting Auctions,” with Bob Day, in the Handbook of Market Design, Zvika Neeman, Al Roth, and Nir Vulkan (eds), Oxford University Press, 2013.
  32. Ascending Prices and Package Bidding: Further Experimental Analysis,” with John Kagel and Yuanchuan Lien, Games and Economic Behavior. vol 85, May 2014: 210-231.
  33. "Adverse Selection and Auction Design for Internet Display Advertising", with Nick Arnosti and Marissa Beck. May 2016. Forthcoming in the American Economic Review.

 

  1. Complementarities and Systems: Understanding Japanese Economic Organization (with John Roberts), Estudios Economicos, 9(1), 1994: 3-42.
  2. Continuous Adjustment and Fundamental Change in Business Strategy and Organization (with John Roberts), Trends in Business Organization: Do Participation and Cooperation Increase Competitiveness?, Horst Siebert, ed., Tübingen: J.C.B. Mohr (Paul Siebeck), 1995.
  3. Complementarities in the Transition from Socialism: A Firm-Level Analysis (with Susan Gates and John Roberts), Reforming Asian Socialism: The Growth of Market Institutions, John McMillan and Barry Naughton (eds), Ann Arbor: University of Michigan Press, 1996.

 

  1. The Role of Institutions in the Revival of Trade: The Medieval Law Merchant (with Douglass North and Barry Weingast), Economics and Politics, 2, March 1990, 1-23.
    • Reprinted in Trade in the Pre-Modern Period: 1400-1700, edited by Douglas Irwin, London: Edward Elgar Publishing, 1996.
    • Reprinted in Reputation: Studies in the Voluntary Elicitation of Good Conduct, edited by Daniel B. Klein. Ann Arbor, University of Michigan Press, 1997.
    • Reprinted in The Political Economy of Institutions, edited by Claude Ménard, London, Edward Elgar Publishing, 2004.
    • Reprinted in International Institutions in the New Global Economy, edited by Lisa L Martin, London, Edward Elgar Publishing, 2005.
    • Reprinted in Anarchy and the Law, edited by Edward Stringham, New Brunswick, New Jersey: Transaction Publishers, 2006.
    • Reprinted in Social Norms, Non-Legal Sanctions, and the Law, edited by Eric A Posner, London, Edward Elgar Publishing, 2007.
  2. Coordination, Commitment and Enforcement: The Case of the Merchant Guild (with Avner Greif and Barry Weingast), Journal of Political Economy, 102(3), August 1994, 745-776.
    • Reprinted in Explaining Social Institutions, edited by Jack Knight and Itai Sened, Ann Arbor: University of Michigan Press, 1995.
    • Reprinted in Trust, edited by Elias Khalil, London: Edward Elgar Publishing, 2002.
    • Reprinted in The Foundations Library of the New Institutional Economics, edited by Claude Ménard, London, Edward Elgar Publishing, 2005.
    • Reprinted in Social Norms, Non-legal Sanctions, and the Law, edited by Eric Posner, London, Edward Elgar Publishing, 2007.
    • Reprinted in Customary Law, edited by Lisa Bernstein and Francesco Parisi, London, Edward Elgar Publishing, forthcoming.

 

  1. Communication and Inventories as Substitutes in Organizing Production (with John Roberts), Scandinavian Journal of Economics, 90, 1988, 275-89.
  2. The Economics of Modern Manufacturing: Technology, Strategy and Organization (with John Roberts), American Economic Review, 80(3), June 1990, 511-28.
    • Reprinted in Vestnik St. Petersburgskogo Universiteta, Economics seria (the Journal of the Economics Faculty of St. Petersburg University) 5(2), 1993 (in translation).
    • Reprinted in Economics of the Firm: Lessons in Business Organization edited by Andrei Demin and Valery Katkalo, St. Petersburg, Russia: 1994.
    • Reprinted in The Economics of Communications and Information edited by Donald Lamberton, Cheltenham: Edgar Elgar Publishing, 1996.
    • Reprinted in Readings in Applied Microeconomic Theory: Market Forces and Solutions, edited by Robert E. Kuenne, Blackwell Publishers, 2000.
    • Reprinted in Fundamentals of Business Strategy, edited by Mie Augur and David Teece, Sage Publications, 2007.
  3. Complementarities, Momentum, and the Evolution of Modern Manufacturing (with Yingyi Qian and John Roberts), American Economic Association Papers and Proceedings, May 1991, 85‑89.
  4. Johnson Controls, Inc — Automotive Systems Group: The Georgetown Kentucky Plant (with John Roberts). Case #S-BE-9, Stanford Graduate School of Business, November 1993.
  5. Complementarities and Fit: Strategy, Structure and Organizational Change in Manufacturing (with John Roberts), Journal of Accounting and Economics, 19(2‑3), March-May, 1995: 179-208.
  6. The Economics of Modern Manufacturing: Technology, Strategy and Organization: Reply, American Economic Review, 85 (September, 1995) 997‑999.
  1. Competitive Effects of Internet Peering Policies (with Bridger Mitchell and Padmanabhan Srinagesh), in The Internet Upheaval, edited by Ingo Vogelsang and Benjamin Compaine, Cambridge: MIT Press (2000), 175-195.
  2. An Economist’s Vision of the B-to-B Marketplace. Palo Alto: Perfect, 2000.
  3. Advances in Routing Technologies and Internet Peering Agreements (with Stan Besen, Bridger Mitchell and Padmanabhan Srinagesh), AEA Papers and Proceedings, 2001.
  1. Aggregation and Linearity in the Provision of Intertemporal Incentives (with Bengt Holmstrom), Econometrica, 55(2) March 1987, 303-28.
    • Reprinted in The Principal-Agent Model: The Economic Theory of Incentives, edited by J-J Laffont, Cheltenham: Edward Elgar Press.
    • Reprinted in The Economics of Contracts, edited by Patrick Bolton, Barbara and David Zalaznick, Cheltenham: Edward Elgar Press.
  2. Relying on the Information of Interested Parties (with John Roberts), Rand Journal of Economics, 17, 1986, 18-32.
    • Reprinted in Economics of Evidence, Procedure and Litigation, edited by Chris William Sanchirico, Edward Elgar Publishing, Cheltenham, UK, 2007.
  3. Job Discrimination, Market Forces, and the Invisibility Hypothesis (with Sharon Oster), Quarterly Journal of Economics, 102, August 1987, 453-476.
    • Reprinted in Learning in Labour Markets, edited by Michael Waldman, Cheltenham: Edward Elgar Press.
  4. Employment Contracts, Influence Activities and Efficient Organization Design, Journal of Political Economy, 96(1), February 1988, 42-60.
  5. An Economic Approach to Influence Activities and Organizational Responses (with John Roberts), American Journal of Sociology, 94 (Supplement), July 1988, S154-S179.
  6. Economic Theories of Organization: Past, Present and Future (with John Roberts), Canadian Journal of Economics, 21, August 1988, 444-58.
    • Reprinted in The Economics of Contracts and Industrial Organization: A Reader, Peter Buckley and Jonathan Michie, eds., Oxford University Press, 1996.
  7. The Efficiency of Equity in Organizational Decision Processes (with John Roberts), American Economic Review Papers and Proceedings, May 1990, 154-9.
  8. Short Term Contracts and Long Term Agency Relationships (with Drew Fudenberg and Bengt Holmstrom), Journal of Economic Theory, 51(1), June 1990, 1-31.
  9. Bargaining Costs, Influence Costs and the Organization of Economic Activity (with John Roberts), Perspectives on Positive Political Economy, edited by James E. Alt and Kenneth A. Shepsle, Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1990, 57-89.
    • Reprinted in Transaction Cost Economics, edited by Oliver Williamson and Scott Masten, London: Edward Elgar Publishing Co., 1994.
    • Reprinted in The International Library of the New Institutional Economics, edited by Claude Ménard, London, Edward Elgar Publishing, 2003.
    • Reprinted in The Economic Nature of the Firm, edited by Louis Putterman and Randall Kroszner, Cambridge University Press, 1996.
    • Reprinted in The International Library of the New Institutional Economics, edited by Claude Ménard, London, Edward Elgar Publishing, 2005.
  10. Regulating Trade Among Agents (with Bengt Holmstrom), Journal of Institutional and Theoretical Economics, 146(1), March 1990, 85-105.
    • Reprinted in The New Institutional Economics, edited by Erik G. Furubotn and Rudolph Richter, College Station: Texas A&M University Press, 1991.
  11. A Theory of Hierarchies Based on Limited Managerial Attention (with John Geanakoplos), Journal of Japanese and International Economies, 5, 1991, 205‑225.
    • Reprinted in The Economics of Organization and Bureaucracy, edited by Peter Jackson, London: Edward Elgar Publishing, 2013.
  12. Multitask Principal-Agent Analyses: Incentive Contracts, Asset Ownership and Job Design (with Bengt Holmstrom), Journal of Law, Economics and Organization, VII Sp, 1991, 24‑52.
    • Reprinted in Transaction Cost Economics, edited by Oliver Williamson and Scott Masten, London: Edward Elgar Publishing Co., 1994.
    • Reprinted in The Principal-Agent Model: The Economic Theory of Incentives, edited by J-J Laffont, Cheltenham: Edward Elgar Press, 2003.
    • Reprinted in The International Library of the New Institutional Economics, edited by Claude Ménard, London, Edward Elgar Publishing, 2005.
    • Reprinted in The Economic Nature of the Firm, edited by Louis Putterman and Randall Kroszner, Cambridge University Press, 1996.
    • Reprinted in The Economics of Contracts, edited by Patrick Bolton, Barbara and David Zalaznick, Cheltenham: Edward Elgar Press, 2008.
    • Reprinted in Institutional Law and Economics, edited by Pablo Spiller, Cheltenham: Edward Elgar Press, forthcoming.
  13. Organizational Prospects, Influence Costs and Ownership Changes (with Margaret Meyer and John Roberts), Journal of Economics and Management Strategy, 1(1), 1992, 9-35.
  14. Pay, Perks and Parachutes: Do They Pay? (with John Roberts), Stanford Business, 1992.
  15. The Firm as an Incentive System (with Bengt Holmstrom), American Economic Review, 84(4), September 1994, 972-991.
    • Reprinted in The Theory of the Firm: Critical Perspectives, edited by Nicolai Juul Foss, New York: Routledge, 2000.
    • Reprinted in Readings in the Economics of the Division of Labor, Vol 2: Modern Analyses, edited by Guang-Zhen Sun, World Scientific, 2005.
  16. The Internal Politics of the Firm (with John Roberts), The Politics of Exchange and the Economics of Power, Samuel Bowles, Maurizio Franzini and Ugo Pagano (eds.), New York: Routledge, 1998.
  17. Complementarity in Organizations,” with Erik Brynjolfsson (2012), in the Handbook of Organizational Economics, Princeton University Press, John Roberts and Bob Gibbons (eds), pp 11-55.
  1. Limit Pricing and Entry Under Incomplete Information: An Equilibrium Analysis (with John Roberts), Econometrica, 50, 1982, 443‑59.
    • Reprinted in Industrial Organization, edited by Oliver Williamson, London: Edward Elgar Publishing, 1990.
    • Reprinted in The Economics of Information, edited by Steven A. Lippman and John E. Anderson, London: Edward Elgar Publishing, 1994.
    • Reprinted in Readings in Industrial Organization, edited by Luis M.B. Cabral, Oxford: Blackwell Publishers Ltd, 2000.
    • Reprinted in Pricing, edited by Michael Waldman and Justin P Johnson, London: Edward Elgar Publishing, 2007.
  2. Predation, Reputation, and Entry Deterrence (with John Roberts), Journal of Economic Theory, 27, 1982, 280‑312. (+ Details)
    • Reprinted in Antitrust and Competition, edited by Andrew Kleit, Cheltenham: Edward Elgar Publishing, Ltd, 2005.
    • Reprinted in The Economics of Reputation, edited by Jill J. McCluskey, and Jason Winfree, Edward Elgar Publishing, Ltd, 2017.  
  3. Price and Advertising Signals of Product Quality (with John Roberts), Journal of Political Economy, 94, 1986, 796-821.
    • Reprinted in Antitrust and Competition, edited by Andrew Kleit, Cheltenham: Edward Elgar Publishing, Ltd, 2005.
    • Reprinted in The Economics of Marketing, Martin Carter, edited by Mark Casson and Vivek Suneja, Cheltenham: Edgar Elgar Publishing, Ltd., 1998.
    • Reprinted in Readings in Industrial Organization, edited by Luis M.B. Cabral, Oxford: Blackwell Publishers Ltd, 2000.
  4. Predatory Pricing, The New Palgrave: A Dictionary of Economic Theory and Doctrine, J. Eatwell, M. Milgate, and P. Newman (eds.), London: MacMillan Press Ltd., 1988.
  5. Informational Asymmetries, Strategic Behavior and Industrial Organization (with John Roberts), AEA Papers and Proceedings, 77, May 1987, 184-93.
  6. An Essay on Price Discrimination, The Economics of Imperfect Competition and Employment: Joan Robinson and Beyond, edited by George Feiwel, New York: MacMillan and New York: New York University Press, 1989, 365-86.
  7. New Theories of Predatory Pricing (with John Roberts), Industrial Structure in the New Industrial Economics, Giacomo Bonanno and Dario Brandolini (eds.), Oxford: Oxford University Press, 1990: 112-37.
  8. Deterring Predation in Telecommunications: Are Line-of-Business Restraints Needed? (with Susan Gates and John Roberts), Managerial and Decision Economics, 16 (July‑August, 1995), 427‑438.
    • Reprinted in Deregulating Telecommunications: The Baby Bells’ Case for Competition, R.S. Higgins and P.H. Rubin, eds. Chichester: John Wiley & Sons, 1995, 151‑162.
  9. What the Seller Won’t Tell You: Persuasion and Disclosure in Markets, Journal of Economics Perspectives, Spring 2008, 22(2): 115-131.
  1. The Limited Influence of Unemployment on the Wage Bargain, coauthored with Robert Hall. American Economic Review 98(4) (September 2008): 1653-1674.
    • Reprinted in Political Economy: Critical Concepts, edited by Norman Schofield, Dino Falaschetti and Andrew Rutten, New York: Routledge, 2011.

 

  1. An Axiomatic Characterization of Common Knowledge, Econometrica, 49, 1981, 219‑22.
  2. Good News and Bad News: Representation Theorems and Applications, Bell Journal of Economics, 12, 1981, 380‑91.
  3. Topologies on Information and Strategies in Normal‑Form Games with Incomplete Information (with Robert Weber), Game Theory and Mathematical Economics, edited by O. Moeschlin and D. Pallaschke, New York: North Holland, 1981.
  4. Rational Cooperation in the Finitely‑Repeated Prisoners’ Dilemma (with David Kreps, John Roberts and Robert Wilson), Journal of Economic Theory, 27, 1982, 245‑52.(+ Details)
    • Reprinted in Game Theory in Economics, edited by Ariel Rubinstein, Cheltenham: Edward Elgar Publishing, 1990.
    • Reprinted in Trust, edited by Elias L Khalil, Cheltenham: Edward Elgar Publishing, 2003.
  5. Distributional Strategies for Games with Incomplete Information (with Robert Weber), Mathematics of Operations Research, 10, 1985, 619-32.
  6. Rationalizability, Learning and Equilibrium in Games With Strategic Complementarities (with John Roberts), Econometrica, 58, 1990, 1255-78.
    • Reprinted in Recent Developments in Game Theory, E. Maskin, ed., Cheltenham: Edward Elgar, 1998.
  7. Adaptive and Sophisticated Learning in Repeated Normal Form Games, (with John Roberts), Games and Economic Behavior, February 1991, 82-100.
    • Reprinted in Recent Developments in Game Theory, E. Maskin, ed., Cheltenham: Edward Elgar, 1998.
  8. Information and Timing in Repeated Partnerships (with Dilip Abreu and David Pearce), Econometrica, 59(6), 1991, 1713‑1733.
  9. Monotone Comparative Statics (with Chris Shannon), Econometrica, 62, 1994, 157-180. (Errata)
  10. Comparing Equilibria (with John Roberts), American Economic Review, 84(3), June 1994: 441-459.
    • Reprinted in Equilibrium, Donald Walker (ed), Edward Elgar Publishing, March 2000.
  11. Comparing Optima: Do Simplifying Assumptions Affect Conclusions?, Journal of Political Economy, 102(3), June 1994: 607-615.
  12. The LeChatelier Principle (with John Roberts), American Economic Review, 86(1), March 1996: 173-179.
    • Reprinted in Paul Anthony Samuelson, Critical Assessments of Contemporary Economists, John Cunningham Wood and Michael McLure (eds.), New York: Routledge, 2004.
  13. Coalition-Proofness and Correlation with Arbitrary Communication Possibilities (with John Roberts), Games and Economic Behavior 17, 1996: 113-128.
  14. Envelope Theorems for Arbitrary Choice Sets (with Ilya Segal), Econometrica 70(2), March 2002: 583-601.
  15. Multipliers and the LeChatelier Principle, Chapter 18 in Samuelsonian Economics and the Twenty-First Century edited by Michael Szenberg, Lall Ramrattan and Aron Gottesman, Oxford University Press, 2006.

 

  1. Information, Trade and Common Knowledge (with Nancy Stokey), Journal of Economic Theory, 26, 1982, 17‑27.
  2. Private Information in an Auction‑Like Securities Market, Auctions, Bidding and Contracting: Uses and Theory, edited by R. Engelbrecht‑Wiggans, M. Shubik and R. Stark, New York: New York University Press, New York, 1983.
  3. Bid, Ask and Transactions Prices in a Specialist Market with Insider Trading (with Larry Glosten), Journal of Financial Economics, 14, 1985, 71‑100.
    • Reprinted in Financial Intermediaries, Mervyn Lewis (ed), London: Edward Elgar Publishing, 1984.
    • Reprinted in Microstructure: The Organization of Trading and Short Term Price Behavior, edited by Hans R Stoll, London: Edward Elgar Publishing, 1999.
  4. The Real Output of the Stock Exchange (with Timothy F. Bresnahan and Jonathan Paul), Output Measurement in the Services Sectors, edited by Zvi Griliches, 1992, 195-216.

 

  1. Is Sympathy an Economic Value? Philosophy, Economics and the Contingent Valuation Method. Contingent Valuation: A Critical Assessment. Elsevier-North Holland, 1993, Jerry Hausman (ed), 417-441.